• Nikita V. Bykov, Russian University of Transport (RUT-MIIT) (Moscow, Russia), Bauman Moscow state technical university (Moscow, Russia)
• Maksim A. Kostrov, Russian University of Transport (RUT-MIIT) (Moscow, Russia), Bauman Moscow state technical university (Moscow, Russia)

This study examines social dilemmas arising from the introduction of autonomous vehicles (AVs) into a heterogeneous traffic flow that includes human-driven personal vehicles and buses. The analysis employs a traffic flow model based on the Revised S-NFS cellular automaton, which captures the interaction effects among different types of agents. The presence of a social dilemma is identified through the Social Efficiency Deficit, defined as the gap between the Nash equilibrium and the Pareto-optimal distribution of strategies. Several scenarios with varying AV penetration rates and initial traffic densities are considered. The results demonstrate that both the prisoner’s dilemma and the hawk–dove game may emerge between buses and other vehicle types, while AVs consistently exhibit a stable speed advantage, leading to the disappearance of social dilemmas once they dominate the flow. These findings enhance the understanding of how AVs affect transport mode choice dynamics and provide a basis for shaping transport policies that account for the conflict between individual and collective interests.

automated vehicles, cellular automata, social dilemma, buses, cooperative behavior, game theory, traffic flow

2025-12-01